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CONGRESS’S WAR POWERS AND THE
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AFTER
SMITH V. OBAMA
SAMUEL R. HOWE†
ABSTRACT
More than seventeen years after the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the United States continues to battle terrorist organizations inspired by
or derived from al Qaeda under the legal aegis of the 2001
Authorization for the Use of Military Force. The government has
interpreted this law as providing expansive authority to conduct
military operations against actors that did not even exist in 2001,
including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”). Congress has
largely supported this effort in annual authorizing legislation and by
funding the campaign against ISIS.
Despite this permissive legal environment, the government pressed
for even greater flexibility in Smith v. Obama, a 2016 challenge to the
legal basis for the anti-ISIS campaign, arguing that the war powers are
subject to the political question doctrine and thus outside the purview
of the courts. The district court accepted this argument, contravening
recent Supreme Court decisions that narrow the doctrine’s scope. In
doing so, the Smith court cast doubt on the primacy of Congress in
bringing the United States into war.
In response, this Note offers three insights. First, it assesses historical
decisions in cases implicating executive branch war powers in light of
the modern political question doctrine. Second, it critiques the Smith
court’s failure to squarely confront the separation of powers questions
presented by the case. Finally, it offers a series of recommendations for
Congress and the courts to avoid the pitfalls of the political question
doctrine in similar cases in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the Constitution’s explicit directive that Congress, not the
President, has the power to declare war,1 post–World War II practices
have undermined this seemingly clear rule. This trend originated
during the Vietnam War as lower federal courts—which had previously
interpreted the Constitution to allow judicial review of military action
abroad—began to turn to justiciability, and especially the political
question doctrine, to avoid difficult line-drawing questions.2
The political question doctrine precludes courts from reviewing
the wisdom of discretionary decisions reached by political actors, and
properly so. However, it does not prevent a court from determining
whether the official who has taken a challenged action had the legal
authority to act. That understanding of the political question doctrine,
taken to its logical extreme, significantly expands executive power at
the expense of Congress. Such an interpretation would allow
Presidents to rely on vague statutory grounds or the Commander in
Chief Clause3—rather than on congressional authorization—to initiate
and execute offensive military action abroad.4 Finally, aggressive
interpretation and utilization of the political question doctrine could
have unintended consequences in future cases; for example, an
American citizen captured abroad while fighting with a terrorist
organization could be precluded from challenging the legal basis for his
detention.5

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have power . . . to declare war . . . .”).
2. See Stephen I. Vladeck, War and Justiciability, 49 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 47, 47 (2016)
(noting that federal courts regularly heard challenges to military action before the Vietnam War).
See generally Rodric B. Schoen, A Strange Silence: Vietnam and the Supreme Court, 33
WASHBURN L.J. 275 (1994) (surveying federal court decisions that dismissed challenges to the
constitutionality of the Vietnam War).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States . . . .”).
4. There is some precedential support for the proposition that the President could respond
to a military invasion or insurrection without waiting for Congress. See infra notes 128–31 (finding
inherent Article II authority to take military action where a hostile power made war upon the
United States). Further, while this Note does not address this question in detail, this would seem
to be true as a logical and practical matter.
5. Cf. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (enjoining the government from
transferring an American captured while fighting alongside ISIS to a third country because the
Government had neither established that it had a legal basis for the campaign against ISIS nor
that it had a factual basis for the claim that the detainee was, in fact, a member of ISIS). In theory,
at least, Doe’s habeas petition would be complicated by a holding that the scope of the 2001
AUMF as applied to ISIS is nonjusticiable. While Doe was eventually transferred to an unnamed
third country, it is possible, and even likely, that similar situations could arise in the future. See
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The possible reach of the political question doctrine is illustrated
by the debate whether the President has the legal authority to
prosecute a campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(“ISIS”)6 based on the legal authorities enacted in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress quickly
passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“2001 AUMF”),7
which authorizes the President “to use all necessary and appropriate
force” to prevent future terrorist attacks against the United States and
to bring the perpetrators to justice.8 The following year, Congress
authorized the invasion of Iraq in a second resolution, the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002 (“2002 AUMF”).9 By mid-2014, following the rise of the terrorist
group ISIS, the Obama administration had expanded the military
campaign under these authorities to target this new threat in Syria and
elsewhere.10
These events ultimately gave rise to a case—Smith v. Obama,11
discussed at length in this Note—challenging the constitutionality of
the ISIS campaign. In Smith, a district court relied on lack of standing
and on the political question doctrine to avoid determining whether
Congress had authorized military action against ISIS.12 The D.C.
Doe v. Mattis – Challenge to Detention of American by U.S. Military Abroad, ACLU (Oct. 29,
2018), https://www.aclu.org/cases/doe-v-mattis-challenge-detention-american-us-military-abroad
[https://perma.cc/5MVA-F77E] (discussing the case).
6. Observers have coined a number of names for ISIS, including ISIL and Daiish. See Ray
Sanchez, ISIL, ISIS, or the Islamic State?, CNN (Oct. 25, 2014, 1:30 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/09/world/meast/isis-isil-islamic-state/index.html [https://perma.cc/
4HYN-D82D] (citing the multiplicity of names used by governments, media outlets, and others
to denominate ISIS). For the sake of consistency, this Note refers to the organization as ISIS
unless quoting a source that uses a different term.
7. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
[hereinafter 2001 AUMF].
8. Id.
9. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 AUMF].
10. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY
FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED
NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 15–17 (2016) [hereinafter DEC. 2016 MEMORANDUM]; see
also Charlie Savage, White House Invites Congress to Approve ISIS Strikes, but Says It Isn’t
Necessary, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/middleeast/
white-house-invites-congress-to-approve-isis-strikes-but-says-it-isnt-necessary.html [https://
perma.cc/D7MT-RY2Z].
11. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal dismissed as
moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
12. See id. at 304 (dismissing the case for lack of standing and for presenting a political
question).
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Circuit dismissed the case as moot but did not address the district
court’s application of the political question doctrine.13 The district
court’s reasoning, which was not repudiated by the appellate court,
represents not only a significant and dangerous expansion of the
political question doctrine but also a departure from previously
established norms regarding the authority of courts to examine the
legal justifications underlying the use of force abroad.14
This Note examines the origin and development of the political
question doctrine and its relationship to questions implicating the war
powers. It argues that the Smith court misread the Supreme Court’s
seminal decision in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton
(“Zivotofsky I”)15 and that the Smith approach, if widely adopted,
would improperly expand the political question doctrine. The doctrine,
as formulated by the line of Supreme Court cases culminating in the
two Zivotofsky decisions, protects a significant degree of discretion for
the President and his subordinates in foreign policy and military affairs.
However, an expanded political question doctrine, like that articulated
by the Smith court, would preclude Congress from exercising
meaningful oversight of the initiation of the use of military force. That
congressional oversight is a critical constitutional constraint on
presidential power.
The Note proceeds as follows. Part I briefly surveys the facts
surrounding the ongoing military campaign against ISIS that are
relevant to Smith v. Obama. Part II examines the development of the
political question doctrine, with an emphasis on its application to
questions of foreign policy and military campaigns. Part III analyzes
the constitutional and statutory authorities and constraints at issue in
this context. Part IV assesses the district court’s decision in Smith in
detail as a lens through which to examine the political question
doctrine more broadly. Finally, Part V recommends several concrete
steps to Congress and the courts to reduce the scope of the political
question doctrine in this area. These recommendations include more
faithful adherence by lower courts to the Supreme Court’s restricted
reading of the political question doctrine in Zivotofsky I; more
13. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x at 10.
14. See Michael J. Glennon, Smith v. Obama: The Political Question Doctrine Misapplied,
JUST SECURITY (Nov. 22, 2016, 1:04 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/34803/smith-v-obamapolitical-question-doctrine-misapplied [https://perma.cc/497A-3FEW] (arguing that the Smith
court misinterpreted the political question doctrine and characterizing the court as “straining to
avoid” the question whether there was a dispute between Congress and the executive).
15. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012) (Zivotofsky I).
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stringent application of standing jurisprudence to avoid reaching the
political question doctrine; and a reinvigoration of the War Powers
Resolution (“WPR”) that would require Congress to provide a clear
statement before courts will find statutory authorization for a
challenged military action.
I. THE ISIS CAMPAIGN AND SMITH’S LAWSUIT
A. The Emergence of ISIS
The terrorist group ISIS emerged following the U.S. invasion of
Iraq in 2003.16 After the invasion, al Qaeda in Iraq (“AQI”), composed
primarily of Sunnis, played a central role in the sectarian violence that
gripped the country, exacerbating the conflict by targeting Shia
civilians, government forces, and cultural landmarks.17 U.S. forces
fought against AQI until withdrawing from Iraq in 2011.18 ISIS
emerged from the remnants of AQI following the U.S. withdrawal,
rapidly gaining strength in the Sunni-majority, western parts of Iraq.19
The Syrian civil war also contributed to the rise of ISIS.20 The war
began with a series of initially peaceful demonstrations against
President Bashar al-Assad in 2010, contemporaneous with the “Arab
Spring” protests across the region.21 However, Syrian security forces
violently suppressed these protests.22 By mid-2012, Syria had fractured
along largely sectarian lines, with the Shia-dominated regime in the
west, Kurdish separatists in the north, and Sunni groups like ISIS in the
east.23 After another year of bloody fighting, ISIS forces established

16. Stephen Preston, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., The Legal Framework for the
United States’ Use of Military Force Since 9/11, Address Before the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 10, 2015).
17. See Michael Crowley, How the Fate of One Holy Site Could Plunge Iraq Back into Civil
War, TIME (June 26, 2014), http://time.com/2920692/iraq-isis-samarra-al-askari-mosque/
[https://perma.cc/SG6R-U67N] (describing ISIS’s targeting of civilians in Iraq).
18. Id.
19. David Ignatius, How ISIS Spread in the Middle East and How to Stop It, ATLANTIC (Oct.
29,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syriairaq/412042/ [https://perma.cc/S3ZJ-6683].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The Syrian regime depends primarily on support from the Shia and Alawites, the
latter of which is a sect associated with Shia Islam. See Sam Dagher, The Families Who Sacrificed
Everything for Assad, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2018/04/assad-alawite-syria/557810/ [https://perma.cc/K83Q-J9ZQ] (explaining that these
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their capital in Raqqa in central Syria; from there, ISIS oversaw a
“caliphate” that governed over ten million people in Syria and Iraq.24
B. Operation Inherent Resolve
President Barack Obama ordered U.S. military forces to return to
Iraq in June 2014 to counter the threat posed by ISIS.25 President
Obama stated that he took the action “pursuant to [his] constitutional
authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief
and Chief Executive.”26 He characterized the action as consistent with
the WPR27 but cited no statutory basis for the campaign.28 He
announced an offensive against ISIS in September 201429 that was later
designated Operation Inherent Resolve (“OIR”).30 In an address to the
nation, President Obama stated that the government had sufficient
authority to prosecute the war against ISIS under both his Article II
authority and the 2001 AUMF.31 American troops were engaged in
offensive actions against ISIS when allied Iraqi troops captured the
Mosul Dam in August 2014 with U.S. air support.32
Obama administration officials subsequently cited both the 2001
and 2002 AUMFs as establishing legal authority for military action

groups hold key government positions in Assad’s government and provide many of the fighting
forces defending his regime).
24. Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034 [https://perma.cc/HT6M-MKBY].
25. See Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (June 26, 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/26/letter-president-war-powersresolution-letter-regarding-iraq [https://perma.cc/PH8B-H8P7] (describing the scope and goals of
the deployment of U.S. forces to Iraq).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on United States Strategy To Combat
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Terrorist Organization (Sept. 10, 2014)
[hereinafter Sept. 2014 Presidential Address], https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD201400654/pdf/DCPD-201400654.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWG8-6K48].
30. See Exec. Order No. 13,723, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,017 (Mar. 30, 2014) (establishing the
Operation Inherent Resolve Campaign Medal).
31. Sept. 2014 Presidential Address, supra note 29; Savage, supra note 10.
32. See Azam Ahmed, In Retaking Iraqi Dam, Evidence of American Impact, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/world/middleeast/in-retaking-of-iraqi-damevidence-of-american-impact.html [https://perma.cc/3ZHH-5NDS] (describing the role of
American airstrikes in Iraqi military efforts to retake the Mosul Dam from ISIS).
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against ISIS.33 In short, the argument proceeded as follows: the 2001
AUMF provides authorization for OIR because ISIS was derived from,
or is an associated force of, al Qaeda;34 further, the 2002 AUMF
explicitly authorizes military action to address any threat “emanating
from” Iraq and implicitly grants authority to stabilize Iraq against
military threats following the conclusion of the 2003 campaign.
President Donald Trump’s administration indicated in a letter to
Senator Bob Corker, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, that legal authority for the campaign “includes the 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force.”35 The Trump administration
reiterated that position in testimony given by Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.36
C. Smith v. Obama
Captain Nathan Smith filed suit against President Obama on May
4, 2016,37 after he was deployed to Kuwait in support of the anti-ISIS
campaign.38 He asked the court to find that President Obama lacked
legal authority to pursue military action against ISIS, that the campaign
constituted an undeclared war, and that it therefore infringed on
Congress’s constitutional authority.39 Smith personally supported the
military campaign, and stated that he had filed the lawsuit solely to
compel the President and Congress to fulfill their obligations under the
Constitution.40 Smith was joined in his filings by various amici who

33. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 298 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (identifying the
statutory basis relied on by the President as the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs); see also Jeh Charles
Johnson, National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama Administration—Dean’s
Lecture at Yale Law School, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 141, 145–46 (2012) (describing the legal
framework for targeting “associated forces” under the 2001 AUMF). For a more fulsome
discussion of the two AUMFs and their implications, see infra notes 188–211 and accompanying
text.
34. See Preston, supra note 16 (discussing both theories).
35. Letter from Charles Faulkner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Legis. Affairs, U.S.
State Dep’t, to Senator Bob Corker (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015da3bf-d43a-a3dd-b3bf14170000 [https://perma.cc/QR85-MJDM].
36. Rex Tillerson, Sec’y of State, Dep’t of State, Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on AUMF 1 (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/103017_Tillerson_Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR8H-ME4M].
37. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016)
(No. 16-843) [hereinafter Complaint].
38. Id. ¶ 1.
39. Id. ¶ 40.
40. Id. ¶¶ 5–7.
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argued that the Obama administration’s overly broad interpretation of
the 2001 AUMF and the Commander in Chief Clause had read all the
meaning out of the War Powers Clause.41
The Government moved to dismiss on three grounds.42 First, the
Government asserted that the case presented a political question.43 The
Government argued that the question of whether war had been
declared was “‘textually committed’ for resolution to the political
branches”44 and that courts lacked “judicially discoverable and
manageable standards” to decide the case.45 Second, the Government
attacked Smith’s standing, arguing that he had suffered no cognizable
injury.46 Third, the Government argued that Smith had failed to
establish that the United States had waived sovereign immunity to
allow the suit.47 In a subsequent filing, the Government offered an
analysis of the 2001 AUMF, the 2002 AUMF, and other legislation to
illustrate congressional support for OIR.48
While the Government never conceded that the court had
jurisdiction to reach the merits, the Government did present evidence
showing that the campaign was congressionally authorized: under the
2001 AUMF, the executive possesses authority to conduct
counterterrorism operations “against persons who were a part of . . .
associated forces”;49 the definition of associated forces includes persons
“engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners”;50 the 2002 AUMF authorizes the use of force to address
“terrorist threats emanating from Iraq”;51 and Congress funded and
41. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Want of
Jurisdiction at 18–19, Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-843) (“For the
Court to permit the President to make war on the basis of the specious authority he now claims
would wholly defeat the purposes animating the constitutional division of war powers and
Congress’s intent in enacting the War Powers Resolution.”).
42. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)
at 2, Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-843) [hereinafter Reply].
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 14.
47. Id. at 24.
48. See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion to Dismiss at 5–17,
Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-843) [hereinafter Gov’t Mem. of Law]
(citing subsequent congressional enactments authorizing and funding OIR).
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id. (quoting the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-81, § 1021(b), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011)).
51. Id. at 7.
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authorized the campaign against ISIS in fiscal years 2015 and 2016.52
Finally, the Government noted that the President had provided reports
to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution.”53
Unsurprisingly,54 the court dismissed Smith’s claims.55 It rejected
each of his theories of injury to find that he had no standing.56 First, the
court found Smith’s oath to “support and defend the Constitution”57
would not require him to disobey an order to deploy that he thought
might be illegal.58 Second, the fact that Smith believed that he had been
forced to violate his oath of office was not a sufficiently concrete
injury.59 Finally, the court noted that Smith had not alleged any
“[p]hysical or [i]ndividual [l]iberty-[b]ased [i]njuries.”60 This Note does
not address Smith’s standing but assumes arguendo that the court
reached the correct result on the issue.61
The court then addressed the Government’s political question
claim and found that dismissal was appropriate on those grounds as
well.62 The court found that the question whether the 2001 or the 2002
AUMF authorizes military action against ISIS is inextricably bound
with inherently political determinations of what is “necessary and
appropriate” for carrying out the congressionally authorized

52. Id. at 10–15.
53. Id. at 14 (quoting Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, supra note
25).
54. See Vladeck, supra note 2, at 47 (noting that federal courts rarely reach the merits in suits
challenging the legality of the use of military force); Marty Lederman, DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss
in Smith v. Obama, the Case Challenging the Legality of the War Against ISIL, JUST SECURITY
(July 14, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/31984/dojs-motion-dismiss-smith-v-obama-casechallenging-legality-war-isil/ [https://perma.cc/Q63U-39XH] (arguing that the Smith court should
dismiss the case for lack of standing).
55. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 304 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal dismissed
as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
56. Id. at 291–92 (finding that the plaintiff did not have a legal duty to disobey the orders to
deploy); id. at 293–94 (finding that no injury—for the purposes of the standing inquiry—arose
from the plaintiff’s violation of his own oath of office); id. at 296 (finding that no physical or
liberty-based injuries resulted from the plaintiff’s deployment).
57. Id. at 293 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2012)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 293–94.
60. Id. at 296.
61. For a discussion of the role of other justiciability doctrines in deciding similar cases, see
infra Part IV.
62. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 297.
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campaign.63 The Smith court’s decision is consistent with judgments
declining to enjoin a President from conducting an ongoing war.64
However, previous cases—from the time of the Founding through the
Vietnam War—reached the merits to find congressional authorization
for military action.65 Smith’s expansive language describing the broad
powers of the President in this arena, though, seems to suggest that
challenges to the legal basis of a war always present a political
question.66
II. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
A. A Primer on the Modern Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine, rooted in the separation of
powers, limits judicial review of certain types of cases and
controversies.67 The Supreme Court has always considered certain
cases nonjusticiable because they fall within the doctrine, although the
parameters of the doctrine have shifted over time.68 The Court
formulated the modern test in Baker v. Carr,69 the “seminal case” in
this area.70 Baker established criteria for courts to use in determining
whether a case implicates the political question doctrine.71 The Court
noted that political questions are particularly likely to arise in cases
involving:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
63. Id. at 298 (finding that the question whether ISIS was appropriately targeted was
inseparable from the question whether the campaign against ISIS was “necessary and
appropriate” under either AUMF (quoting the 2001 AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a))).
64. See id. at 302–03 (noting several post-Vietnam decisions that declined to reach the
question whether Congress had authorized particular military actions).
65. See infra Part II.B.
66. Id. at 298 (characterizing the question whether military action is either “necessary” or
“appropriate” as being committed to the “political branches” and therefore nonjusticiable).
67. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question
is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”).
68. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803) (opinion of
Marshall, J.) (noting that where the Constitution vests the President with “certain important
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion,” the courts have no
jurisdiction), with Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939) (noting that “the class of
questions deemed to be political” stems from the need for finality of decisions by the political
branches and “the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination”).
69. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
70. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
71. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.72

The Baker Court noted that certain fields, such as foreign affairs,
would be more likely to involve a political question than others.73
However, the Court also noted that “it is error to suppose that every
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance”74 and observed that courts can examine “executive
proclamations” relating to “belligerency abroad” to determine the
rights of Americans or others.75 The Court recognized the need for the
finality that stems from a determination that a conflict has officially
ended for legal purposes, and finality would be furthered by finding a
political question.76 Yet, the Court also noted that if a particular issue
is to be deemed a political question, that finding must rest on “isolable
reasons for presence of political questions” in the specific factual
context.77 That is, the political question doctrine does not allow a
blanket determination that all questions involving war or foreign
affairs must be kept out of the courts because of judicial incapacity to
resolve such questions.78
Subsequent decisions refined the doctrine. In Nixon v. United
States,79 the Court relied solely on the first two Baker criteria in
dismissing a challenge by a federal judge to his impeachment by
Congress; the Court cited only the “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department” and “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it.”80 While Nixon did not explicitly state that a

72. Id.
73. See id. at 211–16 (reviewing subject areas that had been frequently found to implicate
political questions).
74. Id. at 211.
75. Id. at 212.
76. Id. at 213–14.
77. Id. at 213.
78. Id. at 213.
79. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 225 (1993).
80. Id. at 228 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
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case could not present a political question based solely on the four
remaining Baker factors, the Court implied that textual commitment
or a lack of manageable judicial standards would be critical to finding
a political question.81
The Court went further in Zivotofsky I and substantially narrowed
the scope of the political question doctrine.82 The case involved an
American citizen, born in Jerusalem, who wished for his passport to list
his place of birth as “Jerusalem, Israel.”83 A 2002 statute required the
State Department to record the place of birth of a U.S. citizen born in
Jerusalem as Israel if requested by the passport holder.84 The State
Department refused to issue the passport as requested, following a
State Department policy that directly contradicted the statute.85 After
several years of litigation on a variety of issues, the D.C. Circuit upheld
dismissal on the grounds that the case presented a political question.86
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, reversed. First, the
Court reiterated the primacy of the first two Baker factors in
determining the existence of a political question.87 Second, the Court
emphasized the “existence of a statutory right” on the part of the
plaintiff as being “relevant to the Judiciary’s power to decide” the
matter, despite the centrality of sensitive foreign affairs concerns to the
case.88 Finally, while the Court noted that the D.C. Circuit had
remanded the case to develop the record regarding the “foreign policy
implications” of the statute,89 the Supreme Court did not even mention
the remaining “prudential” concerns from Baker as grounds for finding

81. See id. at 229 (stating the standard for the political question inquiry and omitting the four
remaining Baker criteria).
82. See 3 VED P. NANDA, DAVID K. PANSIUS & BRYAN NEIHART, LITIGATION OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS, § 14:3 (2d ed. 2018) (explaining that Zivotofsky I
likely precludes recourse to the political question doctrine based on the “prudential factors
alone”). But see The Supreme Court 2011 Term—Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 176, 316–17
(2012) (arguing that any narrowing of prudential factors in the political question doctrine should
not apply to challenges implicating the WPR).
83. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 192–93.
84. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d),
116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002).
85. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 191–93.
86. Id. at 193–94.
87. See id. at 196 (analyzing the political question doctrine by solely considering the
applicability of textual commitment and the absence of judicially manageable standards).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 193.
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a political question.90 Zivotofsky I cemented the necessity of
demonstrating either textual commitment to the political branches or
a lack of judicially manageable standards before an issue can be
considered a political question; this refinement significantly narrowed
the field of cases to which the doctrine can be applied.91 Further,
Zivotofsky I raised the possibility that the existence of a statutory right
could weigh against categorizing an issue as a political question.92
B. The Political Question Doctrine and Challenges to Military Action
Challenges to military action predate the Supreme Court’s
modern formulation of the political question doctrine in Baker.
Notwithstanding justiciability concerns, plaintiffs have challenged the
legal basis for specific uses of military force since the Founding of the
republic.93 Precedent supports the proposition that the exercise of the
war powers, shared by the executive and Congress, is judicially
reviewable. A brief survey illustrates the courts’ willingness to delve
into questions regarding the use of force. In each case, the reviewing
court found, either explicitly or by implication, that the use of military
force is not committed to the absolute discretion of the executive
branch. Further, courts found or fashioned appropriate standards by
which to decide these cases.

90. See id. at 204, 210 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(describing the final three Baker factors as founded on “prudence,” and concurring on the basis
of a “textual commitment”); id. at 212–13 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the final four Baker
factors as “prudential”).
91. See NANDA et al., supra note 82 (describing the substantial impact of Zivotofsky I); see
also Chris Michel, Comment, There’s No Such Thing as a Political Question of Statutory
Interpretation: The Implications of Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 123 YALE L.J. 253, 260 (2013) (“[T]he
rule against statutory political questions should be recognized as the law of the land.”); Alex
Loomis, Why Are the Lower Courts (Mostly) Ignoring Zivotofsky I’s Political Question Analysis?,
LAWFARE (May 19, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-are-lower-courts-mostly-ignoringzivotofsky-political-question-analysis [https://perma.cc/Q7X8-7SCE] (arguing that Zivotofsky I
“lopp[ed] off the prudential Baker factors”).
92. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 196 (“The existence of a statutory right, however, is certainly
relevant to the Judiciary’s power to decide [the] claim.”). Interestingly, the Supreme Court later
ruled that while the case did not raise a political question, the President had the independent
constitutional authority under the Recognition Power to issue the passport omitting the word
“Israel,” despite the statute to the contrary. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076,
2096 (2015) (Zivotofsky II). Justice Breyer concurred, noting that he still believed that the case
presented a political question. Id. at 2096 (Breyer, J., concurring).
93. See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 37–39, 46 (1800) (holding that the Court was
competent to determine against whom Congress authorized the use of force by reference to the
statute and factual record).
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1. A Textually Demonstrable Commitment. Since the Founding,
the Supreme Court has considered justiciable the question whether a
congressional enactment provides a legal basis for the use of force
against another nation. The Court first implicitly addressed this issue
in Bas v. Tingy94 during the Quasi-War of 1798–99.95 The case involved
an American warship that recaptured an American vessel seized by
France.96 The captain of the American warship sued for half the value
of the salvage under a 1799 law.97 The question turned on whether the
word “enemy” in the 1799 law referred to France.98 The Court
implicitly recognized its own competence to determine who was
targeted by a statutory authorization of the use of force,99 and it
interpreted “enemy” to refer to France.100 The Court used traditional
tools of statutory interpretation to answer this question, reading the
statute in accordance with the existing legal and factual
circumstances.101 In that context, the meaning of “enemy” was made
clear by a previous statute’s reference to France as a hostile power.102
The modern Supreme Court’s clearest rejection of the proposition
that the war power is textually committed solely to the executive is
found in the landmark case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,103
which was decided in the midst of the Korean War.104 It is difficult to
overstate the magnitude of the executive decision that was challenged
in the case. Fearing the results of a threatened strike at the nation’s
largest steel mills, President Harry S. Truman announced his decision
to seize the nation’s steel industry and to operate the plants under
federal control in order to ensure the continued availability of critical
war matériel.105 The district court enjoined the seizure, rejecting the

94. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
95. See id. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.) (describing the larger question of the case as
“whether, at the time of passing the act of congress of the 2d of March 1799, there subsisted a
state of war between” the United States and France).
96. Id. at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.).
97. Id. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.).
98. Id. at 45 (opinion of Chase, J.).
99. See id. at 40–43. (opinion of Washington, J.) (analyzing the issue without explicitly
addressing the Court’s competence to do so).
100. Id. at 42.
101. Id. at 41–42.
102. Id.
103. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
104. Id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that
declaration of a war is entrusted only to Congress.”).
105. Id. at 582–84 (majority opinion).
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Government’s argument that the President had the “inherent power”
to take the action.106 The Supreme Court’s decision is known primarily
for Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion, which lays out a framework
analyzing separation of powers claims.107 The opinion categorized
executive actions into three major categories. In the first, where “the
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress,” he can wield the full inherent authority of the executive as
well as any authority that Congress can delegate.108 In the second, the
“zone of twilight” where Congress has neither authorized nor
prohibited the President’s actions, “any actual test of power is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than on abstract theories of law.”109 Finally, where the President
has acted contrary to a congressional enactment, “then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress.”110
This reasoning presaged the Court’s modern political question
jurisprudence. In essence, where the text of the Constitution or of a
statute requires that a question falls squarely to the President and the
President alone, then the President’s resolution of that question is not
subject to judicial examination. In Youngstown, Jackson reasoned that
Congress had not left the subject area “an open field,” but that it had
instead enacted a variety of statutes governing the seizure of private
property under wartime conditions.111 Rejecting exclusive presidential
control over foreign affairs, Justice Jackson argued:
[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me
more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of
foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown,
can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country
by his own commitment of the Nation’s armed forces to some foreign
venture.112

106. Id. at 584.
107. Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES,
233, 266 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
108. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 637.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 639.
112. Id. at 642.
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Finally, despite a general reluctance to hear challenges to the
Vietnam War,113 two significant circuit court decisions rejected efforts
by President Richard Nixon to reduce Congress’s role in war-making
decisions. First, in Orlando v. Laird,114 the Second Circuit held that
Congress can authorize a war, absent a stand-alone declaration of war
or other explicit authorization, by appropriating funds with the
understanding that the executive will use them to conduct the war in
question.115 Second, in Massachusetts v. Laird,116 the First Circuit held
that congressional enactments other than formal declarations of war
can provide sufficient constitutional authorization for the challenged
use of force.117 Both cases rejected the executive’s position that Article
II gives the President sole authority to determine whether the United
States is at war.
Even in those cases where courts have dismissed challenges to the
use of force as political questions, they have generally exercised care in
precisely delineating which executive-branch actions are implicated by
the doctrine.118 In El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States,119 the
D.C. Circuit120 dismissed a suit brought by the owners of a Sudanese
pharmaceutical plant that had been bombed by the United States; the
court cited the political question doctrine as the basis for the
113. Vladeck, supra note 2, at 47.
114. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971).
115. Id. at 1042–43.
116. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971).
117. See id. at 34 (finding that “steady [c]ongressional support” for the Vietnam War provided
a sufficient legal basis for the executive to continue prosecuting the war, despite the lack of a
formal declaration of war).
118. See Vladeck, supra note 2, at 47 (describing the Supreme Court as using “every way
imaginable” to avoid deciding challenges to the Vietnam War on the merits); see also, e.g., ElShifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (differentiating
between cases challenging the wisdom of policy choices, which the court characterized as political
questions, and “claims ‘[p]resenting purely legal issues’ such as whether the government had legal
authority to act”).
119. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
120. The D.C. Circuit is widely perceived to have outsized influence in developing and
applying separation of powers doctrine. See Patricia M. Wald, Senate Must Act on Appeals Court
Vacancies, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2013) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/senate-mustact-on-appeals-court-vacancies/2013/02/28/e8ad3d3a-8051-11e2-b99e-6baf4ebe42df_story.html?
noredirect=on&utm_term=.239cd8ced2d5 [https://perma.cc/8YFF-Z9R3] (noting, based in part
on her time as Chief Judge, the D.C. Circuit’s unique role in resolving “constitutional questions
involving separation of powers and executive prerogatives”). This may be due to that court’s
relatively high administrative law caseload. Eric M. Fraser, David K. Kessler, Matthew J.B.
Lawrence & Stephen A. Calhoun, The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 131, 138 (2013). Whatever the reason, it seems likely that opinions from the D.C. Circuit
would be treated as particularly relevant in this area by other courts.
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dismissal.121 After noting that “the political question doctrine does not
bar a claim that the government has violated the Constitution simply
because the claim implicates foreign relations,”122 the court found that
the ability of a claim to survive such a bar “turns not on the nature of
the government conduct under review but . . . on the question the
plaintiff raises about the challenged action.”123 This approach
differentiates between challenges to the prudence of military action
abroad, which present a political question, and challenges to the
statutory authority of the government to take an action; the El-Shifa
court implied that challenges in the latter category are justiciable and
do not present political questions.
2. Judicially Manageable Standards.
The requirement for
judicially manageable standards—the second prong of the post–
Zivotofsky I political question doctrine—has not completely barred
questions that implicate the war powers. While courts have consistently
found that claims challenging the substance of the political branches’
decisions necessarily involve political questions,124 this bar does not
extend to challenges to the legality of military action.125 Instead, where
individuals’ statutory or constitutional rights are threatened, courts
have fashioned standards to resolve the specific disputes before
them.126 For instance, courts must answer questions such as whether a

121. See El-Shifa Pharm., 607 F.3d at 844 (affirming dismissal as a political question).
122. Id. at 841 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
123. Id. at 842 (citing Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J.,
concurring) (arguing that claims brought by members of Congress challenging the
constitutionality of the use of military force against Yugoslavia did not present a nonjusticiable
political question)). This issue was explored in greater detail in a concurrence by then-Judge
Kavanaugh; his opinion affirmed dismissal but rejected the majority’s application of the political
question doctrine and accused the majority of a “sub silentio” expansion of executive power at
the expense of Congress. Id. at 855 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
124. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6, 8 (1973) (finding that a challenge to the
content of training provided to National Guardsman was a political question, due to both an
explicit textual commitment and a lack of manageable standards); see also Nixon v. United States,
506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (finding that the word “try” “lacks sufficient precision” to define any
manageable standards).
125. Vladeck, supra note 2, at 51–52; see also, e.g., El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 842 (implying that
courts may hear challenges to the legal basis for military action).
126. See, e.g., Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837–38, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (adopting language
derived from the 2001 AUMF to determine whether a detainee was a member of an organization
covered by the statute); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1334–35 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding
that judicial notice of facts in the world can be sufficient to establish a manageable standard for
determining whether a state of war exists); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (D.D.C.
1990) (same).
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state of war exists, how the enemy is appropriately defined, and what
constitutional clause or statute provides a legal basis for a military
action.127
For most of American history, federal courts have demonstrated
a willingness and ability to find facts sufficient to show the existence of
war. In the early days of the Civil War, the Brig Amy Warwick128 arose
out of President Abraham Lincoln’s decision to implement a naval
blockade of Southern ports following the secession of the Confederate
states.129 The Court ultimately upheld some of the seizures that resulted
from the blockade,130 finding that the President had a sound legal basis
for determining that a state of war existed as a matter of fact as the
result of the insurrection of the Confederate states.131
The Korean War–era Youngstown decision also addressed this
question. The Court implicitly recognized courts’ competence in useof-force contexts to determine both the meaning of the factual record
and Congress’s intent in passing legislation. After all, application of
Justice Jackson’s test for concurrence between executive action and
congressional approval requires, on its face, a determination of what
exactly Congress has authorized.132 Similarly, the El-Shifa court
reiterated the competence of courts to adjudicate issues that may be
closely intertwined with political questions, specifically citing the
ability of courts to determine “whether the government has followed
the proper procedures . . . and whether [an organization] has engaged
in terrorist activity,” without having to reach the question whether the
government’s militaristic response was necessary and appropriate
under a statute.133 Youngstown’s analysis recognizes that many related
127. Bas v. Tingy, 4. U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 41 (1800) (opinion of Washington, J.) (analyzing the
identity of the enemy); Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1335 (analyzing the existence of war); Orlando v. Laird,
443 F.2d 1039, 1042–43 (2d Cir. 1971) (analyzing the statutory basis for military action).
128. Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
129. See id. at 666 (describing the facts of the blockade that led to the seizure of the four ships
in question).
130. See id. at 674–82 (affirming the seizure of the Amy Warwick, Hiawatha, Brilliante, and
Crenshaw).
131. See id. at 670 (finding that the question whether an insurrection is sufficiently serious to
become a civil war “is a question to be decided by” the President). The decision of the Amy
Warwick Court also explicitly affirmed Congress’s sole right to declare war where a de facto state
of war did not already exist. Id. at 668.
132. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Jackson went on to state that the President, acting “pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress,” is legally able to take such an action unless “the Federal Government
as an undivided whole lacks [such] power.” Id.
133. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 843 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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questions may ultimately be nonjusticiable where they only challenge
the wisdom of the government action in question; it also acknowledges
that questions that do not seek such determinations should be heard by
courts.134
More than a century later, in Koohi v. United States,135 the Ninth
Circuit addressed a question that was similarly intertwined with the
determination (or lack thereof) of a state of war by the political
branches. The case arose during the “tanker war,” in which the U.S.
Navy skirmished with Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf.136 U.S. forces
were supporting Iraq in the ongoing Iran-Iraq War, with the goal of
ensuring the continuing flow of crude oil from the Gulf; the Iranians
sought to destroy Kuwaiti shipping (which carried Iraqi oil) and to
thereby choke off Iraq’s economic lifeline.137 Koohi raised the question
whether the accidental downing of an Iranian passenger jet by the USS
Vincennes on July 3, 1988, took place during a “time of war.”138 The
court found itself competent to answer that question using “the normal
tools of our trade—reason and judgment.”139 The court held that a state
of war existed, for the purposes of the statute at hand, “when, as a
result of a deliberate decision by the executive branch, United States
armed forces engaged in an organized series of hostile encounters on a
significant scale with the military forces of another nation.”140 The
court concluded that the tanker war between the United States and
Iran in the late 1980s met that standard despite the lack of formal
congressional authorization.141
A more recent case explicitly addressed both prongs of the
political question doctrine. The court in Dellums v. Bush142 declined to
extend the political question doctrine to grant the executive branch
broader authority to determine the existence of a war as a factual
matter. In the run-up to the Persian Gulf War, the plaintiffs—sitting
members of Congress—sought to enjoin President George H.W. Bush
from going to war against Iraq absent explicit congressional

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 842.
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1329–30.
Id.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1334–35.
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
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authorization.143 Responding to a claim that Congress had not
authorized such a war, the Government asked the court to find that the
complaint raised a political question and should be dismissed on those
grounds; it argued that there are no judicially manageable standards
for determining whether the United States is at war.144 The court
demurred, stating that such an understanding of the political question
doctrine is “far too sweeping to be accepted by the courts” and that
granting the executive “the sole power to determine that any particular
offensive military operation . . . does not constitute war-making . . .
would evade the plain language of the Constitution, and . . . cannot
stand.”145 The court ultimately dismissed the case on ripeness
grounds.146
3. An Illustrative Example: Military Detainees. Courts have often
answered questions related to the war powers in cases where plaintiffs
challenge the authority of the U.S. government to detain individuals
captured overseas. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,147 Boumediene v. Bush,148 and
Parhat v. Gates149 all illustrate the tools available to courts in
determining the presence or absence of a statutory basis for military
action. These cases demonstrate that there often are judicially
manageable standards by which a court can ascertain whether a certain
individual or group falls within the ambit of a statute authorizing
military action.
Hamdi was the first case in which an enemy combatant’s habeas
petition reached the Supreme Court.150 There, the Court found that
Congress had authorized Hamdi’s detention under the 2001 AUMF.151
In making that finding, the Court relied on a determination that the
detainee was, “in fact, an enemy combatant; whether that is established

143. Id. at 1143.
144. See id. at 1145 (noting that the Government asked the court to apply the political
question doctrine).
145. Id.
146. See id. at 1152 (finding that the executive had not “shown a commitment to a definitive
course of action sufficient to support ripeness”).
147. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
148. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
149. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
150. Robert M. Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal
Architecture of Counterterrorism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 163, 172 (2013).
151. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 (finding that statutory authority for the detention did exist,
and therefore declining to reach the question whether the President had inherent Article II
authority for the detention).
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by concession or by some other process that verifies this fact with
sufficient certainty seems beside the point.”152 The Court envisioned
that this “enemy combatant” determination could be made “in a
proceeding that comports with due process.”153 This point was further
emphasized in Boumediene, which implied that courts have the
capacity to review the “standards and procedures” at a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”).154 Both the Government and the
Court characterized “the CSRT process as direct review of the
executive’s battlefield determination that the detainee [was] an enemy
combatant.”155 The Court further noted that “a challenge to the
President’s authority to detain is, in essence, a challenge to the
Department’s definition of enemy combatant, a ‘standard’ used by
CSRTs” in the proceedings of the military commission below.156 Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the majority showed significant deference to
determinations made by the executive; however, the opinion also
found that courts are competent to issue rulings on the question
whether an individual falls within the ambit of the 2001 AUMF and to
devise adequate standards for making that determination.
The D.C. Circuit has also applied the language of the 2001 AUMF
to determine whether certain groups or individuals fall within the scope
of the authorization. In Parhat v. Gates, the court invalidated the
detention of a Chinese national who was captured in Afghanistan.157
Applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, the court
determined that the available evidence did not support the
Government’s contention that Parhat—a member of a Uighur
separatist group who had been captured in Afghanistan—was an
enemy combatant who could be targeted under the 2001 AUMF.158 In
making this determination, the court relied partly on a Navy
memorandum defining an enemy combatant as:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 523.
Id.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787–88 (2008).
Id. at 783.
Id. at 788.
Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 835.
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has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in
aid of enemy armed forces.159

The Government relied on the fact that Parhat was affiliated with
the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (“ETIM”), a Uighur Muslim
group that the Government claimed was “associated” with al Qaeda
within the meaning of the Navy memorandum.160 The court looked to
classified and unclassified evidence derived from interviews with
ETIM members and other sources.161 While the court ultimately
determined that the evidence presented to the CSRT was insufficient
to sustain a finding that Parhat was an enemy combatant,162 the court
strongly implied that executive tribunals (like the CSRT) and Article
III courts are competent to determine whether individuals and
organizations fall within the AUMF-derived definition of “associated
forces” where sufficient evidence has been presented.163
These precedents illustrate the competence of federal courts to
determine whether executive action in the realm of foreign and
military affairs has a legal basis. In fact, these precedents explicitly
reject the idea that the Constitution grants absolute discretion in this
area to the President. Furthermore, courts have proven capable of
formulating standards of decision based both on standards developed
within the executive branch and on careful review of sensitive and
classified records.
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THE ISIS CAMPAIGN
The Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations all argued that they
had sufficient statutory and constitutional authority to wage war
against ISIS and its predecessors. The Obama administration, in
particular, articulated several legal theories to justify the war between
September 2014 and December 2016.164 The most comprehensive legal
analysis of the issue from the executive branch is contained in a
memorandum the Obama administration released to the public in

159. Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y of Def. to Sec’y of the Navy, Order Establishing
Combatant Status Review Tribunal ¶ a (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter CSTR Order].
160. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 838.
161. Id. at 846–47.
162. Id. at 848.
163. Id. at 850.
164. Compare DEC. 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 10, at 3–8 (basing legal authority for
military action against ISIS on the 2001 AUMF), with Sept. 2014 Presidential Address, supra note
29, at 3 (asserting constitutional authority to combat ISIS).
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December 2016.165 Yet, these asserted statutory and constitutional
arguments undermine two pillars of the Government’s political
question defense—the claim that Congress does not have the authority
to regulate the President’s actions in this area, and the claim that there
are no judicially manageable standards against which to measure
executive action.
In his address to the nation on September 10, 2014, in which he
announced the military campaign against ISIS, President Obama
identified two statutory bases of authority for the proposed military
operations: the 2001 AUMF against al Qaeda and associated forces and
the 2002 AUMF against Iraq.166 He also indicated that he would inform
Congress “consistent with” the 1973 WPR.167 Congress subsequently
enacted legislation formally authorizing and funding the military
campaign against ISIS.168 It is unclear whether these enactments could
form an independent basis of executive authority for the military
actions.169
A. The War Powers Resolution
The WPR creates a statutory impediment to the unilateral
employment of force abroad by the President.170 The WPR was enacted
in 1973 as a response to what Congress believed was the failure of the
executive branch to provide accurate and honest information to
Congress during the Vietnam War and as a response to the expansion

165. DEC. 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 10, at 3–8. The Trump administration appears to
rely on the same or similar arguments. See Faulkner, supra note 35, at 1–2.
166. Letter from President Barack Obama to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the
Deployment of United States Armed Forces Personnel to Iraq and the Authorization of Military
Operations in Syria 1 (Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Sept. 2014 Letter], https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201400697/pdf/DCPD-201400697.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EQJ-3CE3].
167. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§
1541–48 (2012)); Sept. 2014 Letter, supra note 166, at 1.
168. See infra Part III.D.
169. Cf. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming dismissal on political
question grounds of a suit filed by servicemen challenging the statutory authority of military
action in Vietnam, and finding that congressional enactment of appropriations legislation is
sufficient to find “mutual participation between the Congress and the President”). But see 50
U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (directing courts not to interpret any provision in appropriations legislation
as constituting the basis for introducing armed forces into hostilities unless Congress clearly
expressed such intent within the legislation).
170. Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV.
101, 102 (1984).
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of the war beyond what was statutorily authorized by Congress.171 It
establishes reporting requirements for the employment or deployment
of American military forces, and it requires that the President obtain
the consent of Congress before introducing American military forces
into hostilities.172 The WPR has four major provisions that work to
achieve this purpose.
First, the WPR requires the President to “consult” with Congress
“in every possible instance” before introducing American military
forces into hostilities.173 Legislative history indicates that the
congressional drafters intended the process of consultation to be
something more than merely informing Congress of a proposed or
already-accomplished action.174 It further requires regular consultation
of Congress until American forces have been removed from the
situation in question.175 The statute does not, however, define
“consultation.”
Second, the WPR requires that the President regularly report to
Congress every time he takes an action that implicates the WPR.176
Section 4(a)(1) places particularly stringent reporting requirements on
the President, requiring a report within forty-eight hours any time he
places forces “into hostilities or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”177
Legislative history indicates that Congress used the term “hostilities”
instead of “armed conflict” because it considered the former term to
be broader, encompassing more of the activities that Congress
intended to cover.178
171. See Thomas F. Eagleton, Congress: Does It Abdicate Its Power?, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 1, 3–4 (2000) (describing the goals of Congress in enacting the WPR, and discussing the
WPR’s failure to reach those goals, in the eyes of the U.S. Senator who was the bill’s author and
original sponsor).
172. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-547, at 7–8 (1973) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2363, 2363–64 (defining the “[p]urpose and [p]olicy” of the WPR).
173. 50 U.S.C. § 1542.
174. H.R. REP. NO. 93-547, at 7 (1973) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2363,
2363–64; see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 21 (1973) (Cmte. Rep.), as reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2349–50 (noting that the purpose of the legislation was to reaffirm the
primacy of Congress in authorizing war while recognizing the obligation of the President to
defend the country in an emergency).
175. 50 U.S.C. § 1542.
176. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
177. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1).
178. H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 2351 (1973) (noting that “hostilities” would include “a state of
confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of
armed conflict”).

HOWE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

POLITICAL QUESTIONS AFTER SMITH

2/19/2019 3:52 PM

1255

Third, the WPR requires the President to take affirmative action
to remove any forces committed to hostilities falling under the purview
of section 4(a)(1) unless certain requirements are met within a sixtyday period.179 This section also includes a provision allowing Congress
to require the President to withdraw forces at any time upon passage
of a joint resolution.180 These provisions can only be waived by a
declaration of war, another authorization for the use of force by
Congress, by the extension of the sixty-day period by subsequent
legislation, or by the physical inability of Congress to meet as the result
of an attack on the United States itself.181
Finally, the WPR sets out guidelines for determining whether
subsequent legislation constitutes an authorization for the use of force
under the WPR.182 Notably, given the backdrop of the Second Circuit’s
decision in Orlando v. Laird, section 8(a) of the WPR states that
legislation—including appropriations legislation—that does not
specifically authorize the introduction of American forces into
hostilities shall not be construed as constituting a declaration of war or
authorization of force under section 5(c).183
The WPR was passed over the veto of President Nixon.184 Since
that time, every President has contended that the WPR represents an
unconstitutional infringement on the President’s constitutional
authority as Commander in Chief.185 Despite these criticisms,
Presidents have largely complied with the reporting requirements

179. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). The statute provides for an initial sixty-day period, but the President
can unilaterally extend the period to ninety days if he certifies that there exists an “unavoidable
military necessity” requiring a longer period of time in which to safely redeploy the forces in
question. Id. Commentators have noted that this provision may also authorize the broad use of
military force by the President, as long as hostilities cease within sixty days. H. JEFFERSON
POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 123 (2002).
180. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c).
181. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
182. 50 U.S.C. § 1547.
183. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1); see also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971)
(finding authorization for the Vietnam War, based on enacted appropriations).
184. Carter, supra note 170, at 102 n.6.
185. MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42699, THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 6 (2017); see, e.g., Overview of the War Powers
Resolution, 28 Op. O.L.C. 271, 273 (1984) (arguing that the WPR is unconstitutional); see also
Alan Greenblatt, Why The War Powers Act Doesn’t Work, N.P.R. (June 16, 2011),
https://www.npr.org/2011/06/16/137222043/why-the-war-powers-act-doesnt-work
[https://
perma.cc/8ZFB-MKPW] (noting that “no president has accepted the constitutionality of the War
Powers Act”).
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established under the WPR.186 In that sense, the WPR seems to have
been effective in forcing the executive branch to provide congressional
leaders with information that might have otherwise been withheld.
B. The 2001 AUMF
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
enacted the 2001 AUMF.187 It authorizes the President to use “all
necessary and appropriate force . . . to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States” by al Qaeda and
associated forces.188 It further authorizes the use of such force against
any “nations, organizations, or persons” who “planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . or harbored such
organizations or persons.”189 The AUMF does not expire.190 Congress
declared that the AUMF constitutes authorization for the President to
introduce American forces into hostilities under the WPR.191
The AUMF provided the asserted legal basis for the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001 and for the continuing military operations in that
country.192 The Bush and Obama administrations also relied on the
2001 AUMF for statutory authority to conduct military operations
against al Qaeda and affiliated entities in the Philippines, Somalia,
Yemen, Pakistan, Libya, and elsewhere.193

186. See WEED, supra note 185, at 57–84 (listing 168 instances where Presidents reported to
Congress, consistent with the WPR, compared to 19 instances where they did not).
187. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 286 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (describing the
passage of the 2001 AUMF).
188. 2001 AUMF § 2(a).
189. Id.
190. Jack Goldsmith, Why a Sunset Clause is Important in Any New AUMF, LAWFARE, (Feb.
5, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-sunset-clause-important-any-new-aumf [https://
perma.cc/D3N5-K3J8].
191. 2001 AUMF § 2(b)(1).
192. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2066–68 (2005) (noting that the 2001 AUMF provided the
legal authorization for the Afghanistan campaign).
193. See MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43983, 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR
USE OF MILITARY FORCE: ISSUES CONCERNING ITS CONTINUED APPLICATION 5 (2015) (stating
that the Obama administration had also conducted “other military operations in . . . Pakistan and
Libya” under the authority of the 2001 AUMF); Memorandum from Matthew Weed, Analyst in
Foreign Policy Legislation, Cong. Research Serv., to Congresswoman Barbara Lee 3–4 (July 10,
2013) (listing all presidential notifications to Congress referencing the 2001 AUMF between
September 2001 and June 2013).
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Both the Bush and Obama administrations developed and refined
the concept of targeting “associated forces” under the 2001 AUMF as
the threat from al Qaeda was mitigated over time. For example, in
2004, the Bush administration defined the scope of CSRTs to include
authority over combatants captured while fighting as part of
“associated forces” without providing a specific definition for that
term.194
The Obama administration formulated this interpretation in a
2012 speech by then–General Counsel of the Department of Defense
Jeh C. Johnson.195 The administration defined an “associated force” as
“(1) . . . an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside
al Qaeda, and (2) . . . a cobelligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners.”196 By September 2014, the
Obama administration asserted that ISIS fell within this definition of
“associated forces” and, accordingly, that no additional congressional
authorization was required to pursue military action against the
group.197 Stephen W. Preston, Johnson’s successor as General Counsel
at the Department of Defense, further elaborated this theory in an
April 2015 speech to the American Society of International Law.198
Relying on Johnson’s 2012 definition, Preston argued that ISIS had
been an “associated force” within the meaning of the statute since at
least 2004.199 He argued that neither the existence of conflict between
ISIS and al Qaeda nor the fact that al Qaeda and other groups might
“splinter[] into rival factions” should limit the powers available to the
executive branch under the AUMF. Preston reasoned that to consider
such things would be to allow the enemy, rather than congressional
intent, to control the meaning of the statute.200

194. See CSTR Order, supra note 159, ¶ a (defining “enemy combatant” to include any person
“supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners”); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 192, at
2113–16 (arguing that individuals or groups can come within the ambit of the 2001 AUMF by
joining al Qaeda in its conflict against the United States at some point after the passage of the
statute).
195. See Johnson, supra note 33, at 145–46 (describing the legal framework for targeting
“associated forces” of al Qaeda).
196. Id. at 146.
197. Savage, supra note 10.
198. Preston, supra note 16, at 2–11 (discussing the legal framework for American military
action under the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs).
199. Id. at 4–7.
200. Id.
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C. The 2002 AUMF
In October 2002, Congress authorized military force against the
government of Iraq as part of the 2002 AUMF.201 The statute was
predominately predicated on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s
regime,202 but it also includes a provision identifying the alleged
presence of al Qaeda as grounds for the authorization.203 The statute
authorizes the President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States
as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to . . . defend
the national security of the United States against the continuing threat
posed by Iraq.”204 As with the 2001 AUMF, Congress determined that
the legislation “constitut[ed] specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.”205 And like
the 2001 AUMF, the 2002 AUMF has no prescribed expiration date.206
The 2002 AUMF served as the legal basis for the April 2003
invasion of Iraq.207 Similarly, following the invasion, the 2002 AUMF
also constituted the statutory basis for the enduring presence of
American forces in Iraq; the executive branch interpreted the 2002
AUMF as permitting the continued combat deployment of American
forces to assist Iraqi government forces against AQI (the predecessor
of ISIS) and other insurgent groups.208 Until either the President or
Congress declares the conflict officially over, the 2002 AUMF will
remain in effect.209 The Obama administration did not initially rely on
the 2002 AUMF for the military campaign against ISIS, but the
administration later argued that the Act did provide a legal basis.210

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

2002 AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.
Id. at 1498–1500.
Id. at 1499.
Id. § 3, 116 Stat. at 1501.
Id.
MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43760, A NEW AUTHORIZATION FOR
USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND CURRENT PROPOSALS 2
(2017).
207. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 192, at 2076.
208. See id. at 2104 n.258 (noting that the 2002 AUMF provided a basis for the occupation
following the successful invasion of Iraq).
209. Cf. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 167 (1948) (holding that the President may
continue to exercise war powers until the President or Congress formally terminates hostilities).
210. See Charlie Savage, Obama Sees Iraq Resolution as a Legal Basis for Airstrikes, Official
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/americas/obamasees-iraq-resolution-as-a-legal-basis-for-airstrikes-official-says.html
[https://perma.cc/R3XVXP34] (describing the Obama administration’s understanding of the authorities provided by both
the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs).
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The Trump administration has also asserted that the 2002 AUMF
provides a legal basis for ongoing military operations, including the
anti-ISIS campaign.211
D. Subsequent Authorization and Appropriations
While President Obama’s declaration of hostilities against ISIS
did not cite this legal basis,212 courts have recognized the authority of
Congress to implicitly authorize the use of force in the form of
subsequent authorizing and appropriating legislation.213 Section 8(a) of
the WPR requires an express declaration of war or authorization of the
use of military force.214 No court has explicitly considered the
constitutionality of that provision.
Congress’s subsequent enactment of appropriations legislation—
like that relied on by the Second Circuit in Orlando v. Laird—might
still form the basis for an implicit authorization of the use of force
under the theory that such subsequent congressional enactment
overrules the WPR requirement for express authorization.215 This
211. See Letter from Donald Trump, President of the United States, to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/text-letter-president-speaker-houserepresentatives-president-pro-tempore-senate-2/ [https://perma.cc/JN86-AC8D] (indicating that
the 2002 AUMF, referred to herein as Public Law 107-243, provides statutory authority for the
military activities detailed in the letter).
212. Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, supra note 25.
213. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that Congress had
implicitly authorized continued intervention in Vietnam—despite the repeal of the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution—by extending the Selective Service Act and appropriating monies to fund the
war). In footnotes, the Second Circuit further described the specific congressional acts that served
as the basis for finding congressional approval, including authorizing legislation and
appropriations bills. Id. at 1041–42 nn.1–3. Authorizing legislation, such as the National Defense
Authorization Act, is legislation that specifies the ends to which the executive branch can (or
must) carry out programs. Appropriations legislation provides the funding, the means, by which
the executive branch can accomplish those ends. In the absence of congressional authorization,
appropriations legislation is considered to implicitly authorize the programs and departments that
it funds. See, for example, 36 Comp. Gen. 240, 242 (1956), stating:
It is fundamental . . . that one Congress cannot bind a future Congress and that the
Congress has full power to make an appropriation in excess of a cost limitation
contained in the original authorization act. This authority is exercised as an incident to
the power of the Congress to appropriate and regulate expenditures of the public
money.
214. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1).
215. See, e.g., Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 OP. O.L.C. 327, 327
(2000) [hereinafter O.L.C. Kosovo Memo] (stating that “relevant case law, historical practice, and
basic principles of constitutional law lead to the conclusion that appropriation laws may authorize
military combat”).
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theory flows from the principle that one session of Congress cannot
bind a future session of Congress through legislation.216 On this
understanding, whatever the intent of the Ninety-Third Congress in
enacting the WPR, Congress has effectively repealed that provision by
repeatedly authorizing the use of military force implicitly through
appropriations legislation.217
In the time since President Obama first announced OIR, Congress
has enacted both authorizing and appropriations legislation addressing
and supporting U.S. efforts against ISIS.218 These laws have provided
for funding of U.S. forces engaged in hostilities against ISIS, and they
expressly contemplate the nature of the ongoing military operations.219
Congress had enacted both appropriations supporting OIR and
authorization language for certain aspects of the counter-ISIS
campaign by the time Captain Smith filed his suit.220
E. Independent Constitutional Authority for the ISIS Campaign
Presidents Obama and Trump have also argued that inherent
Article II authority provides a legal basis for the campaign against ISIS.

216. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (noting that “one legislature cannot
abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature”); see also O.L.C. Kosovo Memo, supra note 215,
at 342 (noting that the WPR did not “bind[] future Congresses, but instead establish[ed] a
background principle against which Congress legislates”).
217. Cf. Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility:
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1399 (1994) (noting
that the Congress that passed the WPR was constitutionally precluded from preventing future
Congresses from declaring war via appropriations legislation).
218. See Reply, supra note 42, at 10 (noting congressional enactments in support of the
counter-ISIS campaign).
219. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, 2386–
87, 2393, 2397 (2015) (providing funding for counter-ISIS operations while prohibiting the use of
funds that are in contravention of the WPR); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, 129 Stat. 726 §§ 1224, 1225(a) (2015) (requiring regular reporting to
Congress on U.S. military forces supporting OIR, and expressly authorizing “defensive
supportive fire” in support of the Syrian opposition); Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1236, 128 Stat.
3292, 3558–62 (2014) (authorizing the President to provide assistance to coalition partners against
ISIS); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128
Stat. 2130, 2276, 2301 §§ 8097, 9016 (2014) (providing funding for OIR and counter-ISIS
operations).
220. Captain Smith filed his complaint on May 4, 2016. Complaint, supra note 37, at 1.
Congress authorized the provision of assistance to allied forces fighting ISIS in the Carl Levin and
Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 § 1236,
which had an effective date of December 19, 2014. Congress specifically contemplated costs for
OIR in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 § 8097, which had an
effective date of December 16, 2014.
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President Obama cited his Article II Commander in Chief authority in
each formulation of the authorities underpinning the campaign,
including his initial announcement to Congress.221 Similarly, by resting
the legal basis for the campaign against ISIS at least in part on “U.S.
national self-defense,”222 the Trump administration has implied that
the President has independent constitutional authority to conduct the
campaign. However, the Obama administration did not rely on the
President’s inherent authority to conduct military action against ISIS
in either the reply brief in Smith v. Obama or in the December 2016
memorandum.223
The President does not have the constitutional authority to
unilaterally declare war.224 This understanding is supported by
statute,225 case law,226 and historical practice.227 However, this
restriction does leave room for significant discretion by the President.
First, in the event that the United States is directly attacked, the
President can respond using military force, despite the fact that
Congress has not yet declared a war.228 Second, the President may be
constitutionally authorized to take military actions in furtherance of

221. See Sept. 2014 Presidential Address, supra note 29, at 3 (“I have the authority to address
the threat from ISIL . . . .”); Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, supra note
25 (stating that the action was taken “pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S.
foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive”).
222. Faulkner, supra note 35.
223. See Gov’t Mem. of Law, supra note 48, at 2 (arguing that the suit raised a political
question because the challenged military action was a matter committed to both the President
and Congress); DEC. 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 10, at 7–8 (omitting Syria and Iraq from a
discussion of the President’s inherent authority to take military action, but including them in a
discussion of statutory authorization).
224. While the President did not formally concede this point in Smith v. Obama, the
Government spent a significant proportion of its brief arguing that Congress had, in fact,
authorized the campaign. See Gov’t Mem. of Law, supra note 48 at 8–13 (noting congressional
action supporting OIR).
225. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (stating the purpose of the WPR as “insur[ing] that the collective
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities”).
226. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted
only to Congress.”).
227. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 45 (2013) (finding that
“with the special exception of Korea, . . . all of America’s most consequential . . . conflicts” were
authorized by Congress).
228. See POWELL, supra note 179, at 119 (noting that the President’s authority to take military
action absent congressional action extends beyond circumstances where the President is
responding to an attack).
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important policy goals, even where the possible consequences of those
actions include the possibility of provoking a war.229 For example, the
President could likely deploy military forces—up to and including
initiating hostilities—in support of an ally to whom the United States
has treaty obligations.230 The Government did not raise any such
argument in Smith v. Obama.231
***
The historical and legal record clearly demonstrates the active
involvement of Congress in regulating the use of American force
abroad; that congressional oversight undermines the presidential
argument of exclusive control in this area. Congress has established a
broad and reasonably comprehensive set of background rules severely
limiting the legal authority of the President to act unilaterally in the use
of military force. Further, Congress has enacted express authorizations
in those instances where it permitted the use of military force. And, as
described above, Congress has regulated in this fashion in the postVietnam era, when members of Congress would presumably be aware
of the growing hesitation of federal courts to challenge executive action
in this area.232 At a minimum, the overlapping constitutional grants of
authority and extensive statutory framework should trigger a careful
analysis in Justice Jackson’s so-called “zone of twilight.”233
IV. THE SMITH COURT MISAPPLIED THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE
The district court in Smith v. Obama did not conduct such an
analysis. Instead, the court fundamentally misapplied the political
question doctrine by holding that it precludes courts from determining
whether a particular terrorist group falls within the scope of a
congressional authorization for the use of force. This interpretation
would substantially increase the authority of the executive branch at
the expense of Congress. The Smith court failed to correctly apply
either of the two critical elements of the modern political question
doctrine: the textual commitment of an issue to a political branch and
the lack of judicially manageable standards. Instead, while facially
229. Id. at 118.
230. Cf. Bobbitt, supra note 217, at 1372–74 (describing both this view and the opposing view
that Congress cannot delegate the power to declare war under any circumstance).
231. See generally Reply, supra note 42 (foregoing any such argument).
232. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text.
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relying on those factors, the court appears to have in fact relied on the
same prudential concerns that the Supreme Court seemingly
abandoned234 in its Nixon and Zivotofsky I decisions.235
A. The War Powers Are Not “Textually Committed” Within the
Meaning of Baker
The Supreme Court has affirmed that courts may not hear cases
“where there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department.’”236 However, the
Court has not found that this prohibition precludes courts from hearing
cases and controversies where both coordinate political branches,
Congress and the executive, have overlapping authority.237 Instead, the
Court found that “[t]he Judicial Branch appropriately exercises” the
authority to determine the constitutionality of a statute “where the
question is whether Congress or the Executive is ‘aggrandizing its
power at the expense of another branch.’”238
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o declare War.”239
In filing suit, Smith expressly rested his claim on the argument that
Congress had not declared war on ISIS.240 The Government did not
argue that the power to declare war is textually committed to the
executive branch, but it did argue that dismissal as a political question
was appropriate because “[t]here is an explicit textual commitment of

234. See Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 202–05 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (criticizing the
majority’s omission of the remaining Baker factors, and arguing that the “inquiry required by the
political question doctrine . . . [is] more demanding than that suggested by the Court”).
235. Compare id. at 196 (majority opinion) (finding dismissal “merely ‘because the issues have
political implications’” inappropriate under the political question doctrine (quoting INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983))), with Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 300 (D.D.C. 2016),
order vacated, appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(finding a political question because the question was “committed to the political branches,” and
because the court was not “well-equipped to resolve” the factual questions presented (emphasis
added)). Other courts have also continued to apply the Baker “prudential factors” after
Zivotofsky I. See Loomis, supra note 91 (criticizing these courts).
236. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 195 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)).
237. See id. (recognizing that courts would be correct to find a political question where the
challenged rule is a judgment “that ‘the Constitution leaves to the Executive alone’” (quoting
Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1231–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009))); cf. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229
(affirming dismissal as a political question where the language of the Constitution “indicates that
this authority is reposed in the Senate and nowhere else”).
238. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 197 (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)).
239. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
240. See Complaint, supra note 37, ¶ 23 (“President Obama is fighting a war against ISIS
without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization.”).
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the war powers not to one of the political branches, but to both.”241 This
argument must fail.
There are two plausible interpretations of the Government’s
argument. One version would preclude courts from reviewing political
decisions by the executive and Congress only where both branches are
textually allocated authority under the Constitution, as is the case for
the war powers. However, in other policy areas where control is
constitutionally divided between the political branches, the courts do
have authority to review executive actions. For example, the President
has the authority to make recess appointments without Senate
approval,242 while the Senate has the authority to “determine the Rules
of its Proceedings.”243 The Supreme Court found that the Senate’s
authority to establish its own rules includes the authority to decide
whether it is in recess at any given time; the Court also held that courts
are competent to determine whether the facts on the ground meet the
standard set out in those Senate rules.244 Based on a finding that the
Senate was in fact not in recess, the Court found that the President’s
attempt to make a recess appointment had exceeded his authority; the
Court thus blocked his appointment.245
Alternatively, the Government’s argument in Smith could stand
for the proposition that only the war powers are allocated between the
political branches in such a way that precludes judicial consideration.
This proposition does have some support from lower court decisions.246
However, reading these cases to support such a proposition overstates

241. Reply, supra note 42, at 7 (alteration in original) (quoting Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
509, 514 (D.D.C. 1990)).
242. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate . . . .”).
243. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
244. See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574–75 (2014) (“[W]e must give great weight to
the Senate’s own determination of when it is and when it is not in session. But our deference to
the Senate cannot be absolute.”).
245. Id. at 2574 (finding that the Senate has the authority to determine that it is not in recess
and to block appointments under the Recess Appointments Clause).
246. See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 142 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that the Constitution
“envisages the joint participation of the Congress and the executive in determining the scale and
duration of hostilities” (quoting Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 31–32 (1st Cir. 1971)
(emphasis added))); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (“If Congress doubts or disagrees with the Executive’s determination that
[military action is consistent with the WPR], it has the resources to investigate the matter and
assert its wishes.”).
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the strength of the Government’s position.247 Put simply, it proves far
too much. Courts throughout the nation’s history have grappled with
the question whether a specific military action falls within the grant of
authority from Congress to the executive in a given instance.248 In many
instances, courts have reached the merits of the question and found
that Congress had, in fact, granted the executive the authority it was
exercising.249 If these decisions are legitimate interpretations of the
relevant statutes, then it follows that courts could properly find that the
executive had overstepped its authority on different facts.
In any event, the Smith court did not expressly commit to either
interpretation of the Government’s approach to determining what
constitutes textual commitment for the purpose of the political
question doctrine.250 Instead, the court emphasized the broad
discretion Congress granted the President in carrying out both the 2001
and 2002 AUMFs by granting the authority to use any force that the
President determines to be “necessary and appropriate.”251 The court
suggested that absent the infringement of a statutory right like in
Zivotofsky I, courts are not competent to second-guess the executive’s
determination of the appropriate level of force.252 That is likely true,
but it mischaracterizes the question the court was asked—not how the

247. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(noting that “[e]ven in the context of military action, the courts may sometimes have a role”); see
also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb –
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 723 (2008)
(“If there is a party with constitutionally sufficient standing to demand judicial protection from a
presidential refusal to obey a statute during war, it is not clear why there should be a general rule
that courts must leave the question to the political branches.”).
248. See supra Part II.B.
249. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d at 34 (finding that parsing of the allocation of
war powers between Congress and the executive was unnecessary where Congress had
appropriated significant funds to the Vietnam War because that appropriation was sufficient to
find “a prolonged period of [c]ongressional support of executive activities”); Orlando v. Laird,
443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that congressional enactments supporting the Vietnam
War satisfied the requirement for congressional support that is implied in the Constitution).
250. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 298–300 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (discussing textual
commitment under the first Baker factor).
251. Id. at 300 (first quoting 2002 AUMF § 3(a)(1); then quoting 2001 AUMF § 2(a)).
252. See id. at 299 (distinguishing lawsuits to “enforce a specific statutory right” from lawsuits
asking “the Court to second-guess the Executive’s application of these statutes to specific facts on
the ground”).
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President should prosecute a war against ISIS, but whether Congress
had authorized the President to prosecute a war against ISIS at all.253
As an absurd example, the court would presumably have rejected
an argument that the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs authorized the President
to use military force against a Venezuelan terrorist organization,
reasoning that neither statute specifies the group as a legitimate target.
While ISIS presents a much closer question, the court failed to address
the claim despite its legal obligation to do so. As the D.C. Circuit
implied in El-Shifa, the political question doctrine does not preclude
consideration of “claims ‘[p]resenting purely legal issues’ such as
whether the government had legal authority to act,” even when those
cases implicate military action.254 The Smith court conflated that
question—whether the statute provided the requisite authority to
prosecute a military campaign—with the question of the wisdom of the
campaign.255 The latter is a political question under current doctrine;
the former is not.
B. Cases like Smith Present Judicially Manageable Standards
The Smith court also noted that “the Court can easily discern that
this case raises factual questions that are not of a type the Court is
equipped to handle with traditional judicially manageable
standards.”256 The court identified one such question as whether ISIS
continued to owe some degree of allegiance to al Qaeda.257 This
approach was, at a minimum, inconsistent with the D.C. Circuit’s
holding in Parhat that the evidence presented by the Government in a
military tribunal was “insufficient to categorize [the plaintiff] as an

253. See Complaint, supra note 37, ¶¶ 17–19 (noting that the executive did not provide a legal
explanation for whether a war against ISIS is consistent with the WPR).
254. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (alteration
in original) (quoting Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (affirming dismissal
where the action challenged the wisdom of military action abroad).
255. Compare Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 299–300 (characterizing the question before
the court as seeking “to determine whether the President is correct that the ongoing military
action against ISIL is in fact ‘necessary and appropriate’” within the meaning of the statute
(quoting 2002 AUMF § 3(a)(1))), with El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 842 (“[W]e have distinguished
between claims requiring us to decide whether taking military action was ‘wise’—‘a “. . .
determination[] constitutionally committed for resolution to . . . Congress or . . . the Executive
Branch”’—and claims ‘[p]resenting purely legal issues’ such as whether the government had legal
authority to act.” (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Campbell, 203 F.3d
at 40)).
256. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 300.
257. See id. (noting disagreement among the parties on this question).
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enemy combatant under [the Department of Defense]’s definition.”258
The Smith court did not note, but might have, the reluctance of some
courts to provide an answer to the question whether a state of war
exists given a particular set of facts.259 The court should have found that
it could answer both questions via “careful examination of the textual,
structural, and historical evidence put forward by the parties regarding
the nature of the statute” and the governmental powers at issue.260
The first and most basic question the Smith court should have
addressed is the existence vel non of a state of war between the United
States and ISIS. In Crockett v. Reagan,261 the same court found that the
question whether the facts on the ground constituted a state of war was
nonjusticiable.262 However, that ruling was predicated on facts that are
easily distinguished from the instant case. First, in Crockett, the
Government did not even concede the existence of hostilities.263 In fact,
the plaintiffs’ assertions that the U.S. military forces in El Salvador
were in combat were specifically contested by the Government.264
Second, the scale of the conflict involved, even on the plaintiffs’
account, was negligible compared to the ongoing campaign against
ISIS.265 The Government’s briefs in Smith described the scope of the
operation in some depth and asserted that the President had authority
to conduct military operations against ISIS under both the 2001 and
2002 AUMFs.266 The Government even cited its notification of the
appropriate congressional committees in accordance with the WPR as

258. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
259. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982) (finding that two news
articles referencing U.S. forces engaged in hostilities in El Salvador were not sufficient grounds
to find that a state of war existed, and finding that the case should be dismissed as a political
question that lacked manageable standards) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
260. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012).
261. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).
262. See id. at 896 (“[T]he cause of action under the [WPR] . . . is non-justiciable because of
the nature of the factfinding that would be required . . . .”).
263. See id. at 896–97 (noting the Government’s assertion that U.S. military forces were not
involved in hostilities in El Salvador).
264. See id. at 897–98 (comparing the Government and the plaintiff’s characterizations of the
U.S. military’s involvement in El Salvador).
265. Compare id. at 897 (noting that the plaintiffs based their suit on unsubstantiated reports
that the Department of Defense authorized hostile-fire pay to troops serving in El Salvador and
on a lone newspaper report of “U.S. Armed Forces . . . ‘fighting side by side’ with government
troops”), with Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 285–86 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (describing the scope
of OIR).
266. E.g., Gov’t Mem. of Law, supra note 48, at 3–8.
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well as congressional authorizations and appropriations covering fiscal
years 2015 and 2016 as additional evidence of congressional support for
the campaign.267 Given these facts—which were included in the
pleadings—and given the inherent authority of the court to find facts
by judicial notice,268 the Smith court could and should have found that
a state of war existed for the purpose of the suit.269
The second question the Smith court was asked to address is
whether ISIS was a permissible target of war under either a statute or
the Constitution.270 The court specifically found that that inquiry
presented a political question because “[r]esolving this dispute would
require inquiries into sensitive military determinations, presumably
made based on intelligence collected on the ground in a live theatre of
combat, and potentially changing and developing on an ongoing
basis.”271 This argument is unpersuasive on two grounds.
First, in Parhat, the D.C. Circuit implied that courts are competent
to determine whether a particular terrorist organization is an
“associated force” within the meaning of a standard derived from the
2001 AUMF.272 The court relied largely on classified sources gathered
from U.S. intelligence agencies in concluding that the available
evidence did not support an “associated force” determination;
ultimately, the court reversed a military commission’s designation of a
Chinese national as an enemy combatant.273 The D.C. Circuit returned
to the same question in Al-Bihani v. Obama,274 and this time it upheld

267. See id. at 9–15 (describing congressional appropriations and authorizations for fiscal
years 2015 and 2016).
268. See 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 5106 (2d ed.) (noting that “Rule 201(b)(2) permits judicial notice of
‘ascertainable facts’”).
269. See, e.g., Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that courts
are able to ascertain the existence of war by using “reason and judgment”).
270. See Complaint, supra note 37, ¶¶ 31–41 (arguing that the campaign was not supported
by either statutory or constitutional authority).
271. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 300 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal dismissed
as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
272. See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 844, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that the evidence
presented was insufficient to show that the detainee was a member of an “associated force,” and
ordering the government to either release him or conduct a new hearing to determine whether a
member of a terrorist organization alleged to be essentially part of al Qaeda falls within the scope
of the 2001 AUMF).
273. See id. at 837, 844, 854.
274. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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the detention for trial under the Military Commissions Act275 of a
Yemeni citizen who was captured while fighting as part of a brigade of
foreign fighters aligned with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.276 The
court specifically noted that “the facts show [Al-Bihani’s group] . . . was
affiliated with Al Qaeda and Taliban forces and engaged in hostilities
against a U.S. Coalition partner”; consequently, Al-Bihani “falls
squarely within the scope” of the President’s authority under the
statute.277
The challenge in Al-Bihani was to government detention, rather
than to the use of military force alone, and the statute in question was
the Military Commissions Act, rather than the 2001 AUMF alone.278
However, the issues raised in Al-Bihani are analogous to the questions
presented in Smith. While the courts have proven more willing to
challenge executive actions in the detention context than other forms
of military action,279 the Al-Bihani court necessarily found that, in
isolation, the question whether a particular force is an “associated
force” of al Qaeda and the Taliban is not beyond the competence of
the court to answer.280
Second, the Government proposed a workable standard in Smith.
The Al-Bihani court noted that the 2006 Military Commissions Act
“provided guidance on the class of persons subject to detention under
the AUMF.”281 However, the lack of a statutory definition of
associated forces in either AUMF is not dispositive. As the
Government noted in its brief to the Smith court, the National Defense

275. Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in part at 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
276. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872–73 (finding that evidence of the activities of the
defendant’s military unit with regard to the Taliban was sufficient to establish that he was a
member of an “associated force” within the meaning of the statute).
277. Id. at 873.
278. Id. at 869–72. Al-Bihani was detained pursuant to military action taken under the 2001
AUMF, so that statute is also discussed in the case.
279. Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528, 538 (2004) (finding that the petitioner’s
due process rights were violated because “the most elemental of liberty interests”—freedom from
government detention—was implicated), with Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 247 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (contrasting, explicitly, the need for deference to military planners in selecting targets for
drone strikes with the need to provide judicial review in detention cases), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
480 (2017).
280. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 (finding that an organization that “supported” al Qaeda
and that was “aided” or “commanded” by al Qaeda members falls within the statute (quoting
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 33, Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d 866 (No. 09-5051))).
281. Id. at 872.
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012282—which was enacted prior to
any of the events at issue in the case—affirms the President’s authority
under the 2001 AUMF to detain individuals who are “part of or
substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces.”283
Congress’s use of the word “affirmation” to describe the President’s
powers to detain members of associated forces under the AUMF
implies that Congress understood the President to already have the
authority to target those individuals and groups under the existing
statutory framework.284 To meet that associated-force requirement, the
Government in Smith presented evidence intended to show that ISIS
satisfied both prongs of the two-part test articulated by Johnson and
Preston;285 namely, ISIS was “an organized, armed group that has
entered the fight alongside al Qaeda and . . . is a cobelligerent with al
Qaeda in hostilities against the United States.”286 The Smith court
could have found that the evidence presented, including classified
evidence, was insufficient or unresponsive to the question. It did
neither.
C. The Smith Court’s Reliance on the Political Question Doctrine
Was Both Misleading and Unnecessary
As the Baker Court noted, the political question doctrine provides
a judicial tool for analyzing separation of powers problems.287 In
describing the alleged constitutional violation at issue, Smith expressly
described President Obama’s campaign against ISIS as “misusing
limited congressional authorization for the use of military force as a
blank check to conduct a war against enemies of his own choosing.”288
On its own terms, the question raised by this allegation could not be

282. See Gov’t Mem. of Law, supra note 48, at 6 (quoting Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 514
(D.D.C. 1990)) (citing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 as
demonstrating congressional intent that the 2001 AUMF covers ISIS).
283. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021(b),
125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
284. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RES. SERV., R42143,
WARTIME DETENTION PROVISIONS IN RECENT DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION 8
(2016) (noting that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 was intended to
codify existing authority under the 2001 AUMF, as interpreted by the D.C. Circuit).
285. Gov’t Mem. of Law, supra note 48, at 8–17.
286. Id. at 5–8; Johnson, supra note 33.
287. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question
is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”).
288. See Complaint, supra note 37, at ¶ 8.
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answered without reference to the statute.289 The Smith court, while
claiming to be incapable of deciding the case because of the political
question doctrine, nevertheless dedicated the entire latter third of its
opinion to actually addressing separation of powers questions. The
court followed Youngstown—the dominant paradigm for separation of
powers questions—closely analyzing the nature of the power exercised
and the underlying congressional authorization.290
Moreover, the Smith court did reach the merits on the question
whether Congress had approved military action against ISIS, finding
that “the Court in this case is not presented with a dispute between the
two political branches regarding the challenged action.”291 The court
devoted nearly half of its discussion of the political question doctrine
to the apparent agreement between the executive and Congress on this
matter.292 The court cited a string of cases to support the uncontested
proposition that “judicial intervention into military affairs is
particularly inappropriate when the two political branches to whom
war-making powers are committed are not in dispute as to the military
action at issue.”293 In making that statement, the court answered the
very question which it said it was incapable of determining: Had
Congress passed legislation under which the executive could take
lawful military action against ISIS?
In a footnote, the court offered one hint at a possible reason why
it did not reach the merits of the case; it noted that it declined to
address the question whether the subsequent authorizations and
appropriations constituted a sufficient statutory basis in order to avoid
addressing the constitutionality of section 8(a) of the WPR.294 Such
289. While the Obama administration publicly argued that the executive possesses sufficient
exclusive authority under Article II to prosecute the campaign against ISIS, see, e.g., Sept. 2014
Presidential Address, supra note 29 (stating that the President has sufficient authority to wage
war against ISIS, but nevertheless stating “I believe we are strongest as a nation when the
President and Congress work together”), the Government did not raise this argument explicitly
in its Smith filings.
290. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 297–303 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (analyzing the
President’s decision to conduct the campaign in light of steady congressional support); see also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(analyzing the executive action in light of the existing statutory scheme and finding no
congressional support); Barron & Lederman, supra note 247, at 701 (describing Justice Jackson’s
three-part analysis as “the conventional post-Youngstown orientation”).
291. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 301.
292. Id. at 301–03.
293. Id. at 302.
294. Id. at 302 n.15.

HOWE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1272

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/19/2019 3:52 PM

[Vol. 68:1231

hesitation is neither surprising295 nor necessarily improper.296 However,
in extending the political question to cover a challenge to the authority
of the executive to wage war on targets of its choosing, the court
brought into question the meaning of the Constitution itself, rather
than that of a mere statute.
The Government in Smith did not claim that it has inherent
constitutional authority to initiate a war without congressional
approval,297 and the court did not explicitly make any such finding.298
However, by dismissing the case as a political question, the court
implied that the subject matter falls entirely within the purview of the
executive branch.299 In an apparent effort to avoid deciding the
constitutionality of a statutory provision, section 8(a) of the WPR, the
court instead cast doubt on the constitutional authority of Congress to
constrain the executive under its war-powers authority. If every finding
of a political question is, in effect, a victory on the merits for the
executive branch vis-a-vis Congress,300 then the court’s decision in
Smith was a significant advancement of the proposition that whatever
authority Congress may have under the Declare War Clause is never
judicially enforceable.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Smith court’s expansive reading of the political question
doctrine was overbroad, but it represents the logical culmination of

295. Compare Carter, supra note 170 (arguing that the WPR is constitutional), with ROBERT
F. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
107–33 (1983) (arguing that the WPR is likely unconstitutional).
296. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of Congress
is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible
by which the question may be avoided.”). But see Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 395 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that in some instances, the avoidance doctrine decides, rather
than avoids, constitutional questions).
297. See Reply, supra note 42, at 2 (noting that “this case would require answering questions
that are ‘textually committed’ for resolution to the political branches” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962))).
298. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 298 (basing dismissal on the political question
doctrine—specifically on the textual commitment of “foreign policy and national security” to “the
political branches”).
299. Cf. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 195–96 (2012) (finding that the lower courts erred in
dismissing the challenges as political questions because they implicated a private statutory right).
300. See Louis M. Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 477 (2004) (arguing that decisions reached under the political question
doctrine can be understood as decisions on the underlying merits of the case).
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increasing deference to the executive on matters of national security;
the unique nature of the United States’ adversaries under the 2001
AUMF as compared to previous conflicts; and Congress’s lack of
oversight beyond annual authorizations and appropriations legislation.
This Part recommends solutions for each of those issues.
First, federal courts should take Zivotofsky I at its word when they
are asked to differentiate between the statutory basis for and the
wisdom of government action, instead of “treat[ing] the two questions
as one and the same.”301 It is relatively easy to use such a formulation
when the court finds that a lawsuit challenges the wisdom of
government action; such a suit is a political question both in the sense
that it challenges an action that was subject to the discretion of actors
within one political branch and in the sense that a court could not use
judicially manageable standards without substituting its own judgment
for that of the political-branch actors.302 In such cases, dismissal as a
political question is appropriate.
Second, the nature of suits challenging military action abroad are
such that there will often be other grounds on which dismissal is
appropriate; courts have dismissed similar actions on grounds of
standing,303 ripeness,304 and redressability.305 In fact, some
commentators have gone so far as to argue that standing jurisprudence
has subsumed the political question doctrine entirely.306 These
justiciability tools may be particularly useful where a court wishes to
avoid enjoining the President from carrying out an ongoing military
campaign, as in Smith. Because the political question doctrine
implicates the constitutional separation of powers,307 courts can and
should dismiss suits on other grounds before reaching the political

301. John R. Crook, U.S. Supreme Court Rules Statute Directing State Department to Record
Jerusalem-Born Citizen’s Birthplace as “Israel” Does Not Raise Political Question, Contemporary
Practices of the United States Relating to International Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 644, 645 (2012);
see also, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(differentiating between challenges to the wisdom of government action and to the legal basis for
that action).
302. See El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 842–43 (identifying challenges to the “prudence of the political
branches” as unavoidably political questions).
303. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 289.
304. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1152 (D.D.C. 1990).
305. N.J. Peace Action v. Obama, No. 08-2315, 2009 WL 1416041, at *5 (D.N.J. May 19, 2009).
306. E.g., Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Along: Do We Still Need The Political Question
Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303, 333 (1996).
307. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–11 (1962) (explaining that the nonjusticiability of
political questions stems from the separation of powers).
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question doctrine and creating a sweeping precedent where a narrow
decision could have reached the same, correct result.308
Once a court has reached the merits of the legality of military
action, the critical question becomes the formulation of judicially
manageable standards by which to adjudicate the case. Two
alternatives present themselves: develop a set of standards de novo or
adapt standards developed by the parties. While there may be some
cases where judges determine that they are competent to develop
manageable standards absent input from the parties,309 in cases
implicating national security and military action, it seems more likely
that judges will rely on the parties (and particularly the Government)
to provide suggestions.310 As Justice Souter reasoned in Nixon, courts
could always retain the flexibility to reject proposed standards in the
event that the Government proposes or employs a sufficiently arbitrary
standard.311
This is not to suggest that the questions presented in this context
will be simple ones. To take Smith as an example, courts might be asked
to consider questions such as whether a given set of facts is sufficient
to find that “war” exists; the meaning of a statute authorizing force
against a given set of actors; whether an organization falls within that
set of permissible targets under the statute; and whether the executive
has an independent constitutional authority to take the challenged
action. However, courts have already devised standards to answer each

308. As Justice Brandeis explained:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although properly presented by
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided upon two grounds, one involving a
constitutional question, the other involving a question of statutory construction or
general law, the Court will decide only the latter.
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
309. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 225, 253–54 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring)
(suggesting that arbitrary procedures for impeachment cases might justify judicial intervention,
despite textual commitment of the matter to Congress).
310. See, e.g., Parhat v. Gates, 532 U.S. 822, 837–38 (2008) (adopting the Government’s
standards for determining whether an alleged terrorist group was an “associated force” of al
Qaeda). The Government did reference the “associated forces” framework in its brief to the
Smith court, but it did not develop that legal framework to the same degree seen in
contemporaneous public statements by administration officials. Compare Gov’t Mem. of Law,
supra note 48, at 30–31 (arguing that courts lack the capacity to determine whether an individual
or group falls within the ambit of the 2001 or 2002 AUMFs), with Preston, supra note 16
(articulating one set of possible standards).
311. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 253–54 (arguing against accepting arbitrary and capricious
standards, even given clear textual commitment).
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of those questions.312 The fact that questions require careful analysis,
hinge on access to classified information, or seem politically sensitive
does not preclude their consideration.
Finally, courts should apply the same principles of statutory
interpretation and canons of construction to questions implicating the
WPR that they would apply to other statutes. Specifically, in asking
whether a statute has authorized the use of military force, courts should
weigh the WPR’s section 8(a) prohibition on using appropriations
absent an explicit grant of authority, on the one hand, against a reading
of the statute that would, on the other hand, give full effect to all the
WPR’s provisions.313 Reading section 8(a) as an absolute bar would
unconstitutionally restrict the ability of future Congresses to conduct
foreign affairs under the principle that one Congress cannot bind a
future Congress.314 However, courts should keep the language of
section 8(a) in mind, considering that Congress enacts all subsequent
legislation against the background principle that absent clear statutory
language, laws do not authorize the President to conduct a war.
This approach would be consistent with longstanding principles of
statutory interpretation: “[R]epeals by implication are not favored . . .
and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is clear and manifest.”315
The 2001 AUMF both reiterates and satisfies the WPR’s clearstatement requirement.316 Congress continues to legislate as if the
WPR is good law.317 Finally, to the constitutional question, even if the

312. See Parhat, 532 U.S. at 837–38 (finding that the group to which the defendant belonged
was not an authorized target under the statute); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 640–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (finding that the President did not have
independent constitutional authority to take the challenged executive action); Brig Amy
Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862) (finding the de facto existence of war); Bas v. Tingy,
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) (inferring from a statute’s use of the word “enemy” that it permitted
military action against French targets).
313. See 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (stating that appropriations legislation shall not provide the
legal basis for military action unless otherwise explicitly authorized).
314. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (establishing this principle).
315. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987).
316. 2001 AUMF § 2(b) (“Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the
Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within
the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.”).
317. See, e.g., Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1236, 128 Stat. 3292, 3560 (2014) (“Nothing in
this section shall be construed to constitute a specific statutory authorization for the introduction
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein hostilities are clearly
indicated by the circumstances.”).
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WPR is not binding on Congress, it may still be binding on the courts
that interpret Congress’s enactments.318
CONCLUSION
The political question doctrine is an important tool to avoid
entangling the judiciary in matters over which the courts properly have
no jurisdiction. However, given the realities of a presidential system,
an overly broad reading of the doctrine risks giving the executive
unfettered control over areas of policy that are properly shared
between Congress and the President under the Constitution. Since the
Vietnam War era, courts have increasingly used the political question
doctrine to avoid reaching critical questions of foreign and military
policy; that invocation of the doctrine rests on uneasy constitutional
footing. The interpretation of the political question doctrine embraced
by the Smith court represents a dramatic expansion of executive power
that should be repudiated.

318. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (noting that a court “must read [allegedly
conflicting] statutes to give effect to each if [it] can while preserving their sense and purpose”).

